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Among the issues discussed are the following. The present article considers explanatory issues pertaining to this so-called, tunnel effect, with special reference to Gibson' s perception theory and the visual activity that I have been calling reflective seeing. Subjects can have continuous visual experience of an object's movement across a display though the movement's middle phase takes place behind an opaque screen.